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ABSTRACT: According to immunology’s prevailing paradigm, immunity is based on self/nonself discrimination and 
thus requires a construction of identity. Two orientations vie for dominance: The original conception, con-
ceived in the context of infectious diseases, regards the organism as insular and autonomous, an entity that re-
quires defense of its borders. An alternate view places the organism firmly in its environment in which both 
benign and onerous encounters occur. On this latter relational account, active tolerance allows for coopera-
tive relationships with other organisms in the larger ecological economy. These contending orientations —one 
derived from biomedicine and the other from the ecological sciences— have drawn the attention of social sci-
entists and culture critics. On the one hand, feminists have portrayed immune theory as based upon borrowed 
social notions of identity that reflect male aggressive values and thus distort more balanced accounts of immu-
nity; and, on the other hand, other commentary projects immune theory as a framework in which analysis of 
Western societies putatively reveals analogous patterns of ‘self’ and ‘other’ interactions, where autoimmunity 
and immunization are understood as expressions of the insular understanding of identity. Here, a meta-inter-
pretation is presented that shows how these critiques place the immune self on a spectrum stretching from its 
formulation as an autonomous agent, a modernist conception of the independent individual, to a postmodern 
portrayal in which this conception of selfhood has been deconstructed. Accordingly, immunology is drawn into 
a wide-ranging debate about agency, where differing interpretations of immunity serves as a template in which 
competing understandings of human social intercourse is modeled.
Key words: immunology, immunity, selfhood, postmodernism, ecology, individuality.
RESUMEN: Según el paradigma dominante en inmunología, la inmunidad está basada en la discriminación entre yo/no-
yo y requiere, por tanto, una construcción de la identidad. Dos orientaciones compiten por dominar: la concep-
ción original, concebida en el contexto de las enfermedades infecciosas contempla al organismo como aislado y 
autónomo, como una entidad que necesita defender sus fronteras. Una visión alternativa sitúa firmemente al 
organismo en su entorno, en el cual suceden tanto encuentros beneficiosos como costosos. En este enfoque re-
lacional, la tolerancia activa permite relaciones cooperativas con otros organismos en una economía ecológica 
más amplia. Estas orientaciones en liza —una derivada de la biomedicina y otra de las ciencias ecológicas— han 
llamado la atención de los científicos sociales y de los críticos de la cultura. Por una parte, el feminismo ha des-
crito la teoría inmunológica como basada en nociones sociales prestadas de identidad que reflejan los valores 
agresivos del macho y que, de este modo, impiden una explicación más equilibrada de la inmunidad. Por otra 
parte, otro comentario proyecta la teoría inmunológica como un marco en el que el análisis de las sociedades oc-
cidentales revela aparentemente patrones análogos de interacciones ‘yo’ y ‘otros’, en las que la autoinmunidad y 
la inmunización son entendidas como expresiones de la comprensión insular de la identidad. Se ofrece aquí una 
meta-representación que muestra cómo estas críticas sitúan al yo inmune en un espectro que va desde su for-
mulación como un agente autónomo, una concepción modernista del individuo independiente, a una visión 
postmoderna en la que esta concepción de la identidad ha sido deconstruida. De acuerdo con esto, la inmunolo-
gía recoge un amplio debate sobre la agencia en el que diferentes interpretaciones de la inmunidad sirven como 
molde en el que se modelan comprensiones competidoras de la comprensión de las relaciones sociales humanas.
Palabras clave: Inmunología, inmunidad, identidad, postmodernismo, ecología, individualidad.
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Introduction
Contemporary immunology has established its fundamental theory as a biological expres-
sion of personal identity, wherein the ‘immune self’ is defended by the immune system. We 
can trace this theme to those discoveries that led to the discovery of the bacterial etiology of 
infectious diseases and the elucidation of host defense mechanisms that soon followed (Sil-
verstein 2009). This is the historical account of a clinical science, a tool of medicine, and as 
such it focuses almost exclusively on the role of immunity as a defender of the host. And, of 
course, the host of greatest interest is the patient, a “self” suffering from microbial attack.
Critical appraisal of immunology’s dominant paradigm reveals a major presupposition, 
namely, that there is a definable self that might be defended. This view has been subject to 
rigorous scientific debate (Langman 2000). Indeed, because autoimmunity and tolerance 
are increasingly regarded as falling on a broad spectrum of immune responses and self/non-
self differentiation cannot be reduced to molecular signatures, stable boundaries of the im-
mune self have evaded definition (Matzinger 1994; Tauber 2000; Pradeu 2010; 2012). Ac-
cording to these views, immunity is not in service to an entity, a self, but rather immune 
activities have assumed an anthropomorphic agency because of ideas projected from com-
mon notions of personal identity.
This formulation of immune identity has been challenged by a medley of findings 
that have highlighted how the kind of immune response evoked is framed by the context in 
which the object is encountered rather than its intrinsic foreign character relative to some 
stable entity. In other words, the self/nonself model is not governed by simple on/off rules, 
because discrimination that determines identity plays on a dynamic spectrum of func-
tional criteria (Tauber 2015a; 2015b). And with that alteration in immunology’s principal 
model, immune identity assumes various degrees of “liquidity” (Grignolio et al., 2014). On 
the revisionist account, aging, differing nutrition, and altered geography continuously re-
shape the antigenicity of physical entities and thus create new targets of oral tolerance or 
rejection. Correspondingly, identity changes over time. Simply stated, immune profiles are 
highly contingent on individual experience and cannot remain static (Brodin et al., 2015). 
From this understanding the status of the immune self as a governing principle of immu-
nology falters.
The hitherto dominant defensive orientation largely ignores the role of active immune 
tolerance that mediates the organism’s intercourse with its environment and, more gener-
ally, the co-operative relationships characterizing the holobiont and symbionts with which 
the organism co-exists (Gilbert, Sapp and Tauber 2012).1 A newly recognized ‘ecological 
imperative’ is gaining influence, in which entities “are what they are because of the environ-
ment in which they are found” (Birch and Cobb 1981, 94). Eco-immunology has emerged 
as a field of study that integrates immunology and ecology, and with that synthesis, the no-
tion of an organism in dynamic relationships accounts for both predator relationships as 
1 As summarized by Margulis (1991), ‘symbiosis’ has several meanings and refers to at least four kinds 
of relationships: 1) spatial (obligate and facultative), 2) temporal (cyclical, permanent, behavioral) 
3) metabolic (partial/total dependence, biotrophic, metabolic), and 4) genetic (gene-product transfer 
[protein, RNA] or gene transfer). The assembly of different organisms into co-operative complex con-
sortia, designates a holobiont (Rosenberg et al., 2007), which defies any singular definition of organis-
mal identity as independent agents.
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well as the complex economies of organisms in collective associations and in benevolent 
intercourse with their environment (Gewin 2011; Martin, Hawley and Ardia 2011; De-
mas and Nelson 2011; Maligoli and Ottaviani 2014). This new inter-disciplinary field thus 
widens the scope of immunity and thereby shifts the focus of immune functions to a larger 
framework that allows for both competitive and co-operative exchanges. In that move, the 
line demarcating self and other wavers. Add the normal surveillance functions of the “rest-
ing” immune system engaged in the ordinary physiology of cell turnover and other internal 
“housekeeping” immunity assumes integration with normal physiology (Tauber 2015a). 
Accordingly, the immune system regulates the identity of organism —both within and 
without— to encompass traditional defensive functions as well as tolerant ones. On this 
view, a more fully ecological understanding of immunity declares a revision that balances 
defense and cooperation (Ulvestad 2007; Tauber 2008a; 2008b; Swiatczak 2013).
When older definitions of immunity shift from the original defensive formulation in 
service to an autonomous entity to one that embraces an ecological orientation, agency as-
sumes a relational structure and new designs of identity are invoked. That scientific shift 
has been described elsewhere (Tauber 2013a; 2015a; 2015b), and here I examine the to-
and-fro exchange of immunology’s key idiom, the immune self, as it moves between the 
laboratory and its wider social culture. That dialogue reflects the scientific debate concern-
ing the nature of immunity, which in turn determines how immune identity is character-
ized. At this focus point swirling around selfhood, the laboratory and its supporting culture 
meet. That conceptual re-orientation has resonance beyond the laboratory and constitutes 
a rich example of science and society in dialogue.
Immunology in dialogue
Given that immunology has been defined as the science of self/nonself discrimination, the 
centrality of agency pervades immune theory and practice. Indeed, the ‘immune self’ has 
rich metaphorical appeal and has enjoyed great idiomatic utility in modeling immune func-
tions (Crist and Tauber 1999). Critics have argued that immunology, a science of cells and 
molecules, has been widely coopted to naturalize folk psychology about what it means to 
be a self. And more, they have detected deep resonances between the utility of immune self-
hood and broader characterizations of personal identity that structure Western societies. 
So on these interpretations, on the one hand, immunology inculcates social values into the 
descriptions and interpretations of immunological phenomena, and, on the other hand, 
immunity is a ready vehicle for characterizing the society in which ‘selves’ live. This is sci-
ence traveling on a two-way highway.
A vast science studies literature has discussed how science draws from a broad spec-
trum of extra-curricular influences, which stretch from the almost trivial mapping of the 
social scientific practice (Latour and Woolgar 1979; Mody and Kaiser 2008) to the very 
core of scientific conceptualizing. Regarding immunology specifically, these sources may be 
considered from several perspectives:
1. Immunologists have borrowed from philosophical and psychological notions of 
personal identity to fashion various formulations of immune selfhood (Tauber 
1994), whose limits have been extensively discussed within the scientific commu-
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nity (Langman 2000). Immunology’s uses of self and its congeners have been easily 
extracted from cultural resources and philosophical formulations to inform vari-
ous models of immunity and have thus served as ready models for assigning iden-
tity functions (Tauber 1994). The most ubiquitous meaning refers to a construc-
tion of identity (the immune self) that is characterized by an insular autonomy 
and employs circumscribed borders to distinguish itself from others (Löwy 1991; 
Howes 2010).
2. The socio-political elements of immunology have been easily tracked to the disci-
pline’s grounding in the clinical setting and the complex sociology of laboratory 
organization and funding (e.g. Löwy 1992; 1996; Keating and Cambrosio 2003), 
which in turn is largely determined by the medical challenges set before immunol-
ogists (Silverstein 2009).
3. Institutional support frames immunology’s investigative agenda. These influences 
range from the dictates delivered by government through financial commitments 
and policy decrees; positive responses to wider industrial (Croissant and Smith-
Doerr 2008), military (Rappert, Balmer and Stone 2008), and political (Rouse 
1987; Greenberg 2007) interests; and acknowledgement of citizen activism for dis-
ease-specific research (Bucchi and Neresini 2008; Hess et al., 2008).
4. Feminists argue that immunologists are oriented by a male ethos in which domina-
tion and aggressive competitive modalities have organized the discipline in ways in-
imical to seeing cooperative relationships and inclusive tolerance as the mainstays 
of immunity (e.g. Weasel 2001; Napier 2003; 2012; Howes 2008, 2012; Scheper-
Hughes 2012). Few would dispute the general adage that scientists both actively 
draw from, and are directed by, their supporting culture, but feminist commenta-
tors have contended that the immune self as a scientific concept refracts cultural mo-
res, submerged prejudices, and undeclared political agendas. (This is a more radical 
position than the modest “pluralistic” [Wilson 2005, 11-14] claim described above 
by #1).
5. How cognitive and linguistic faculties influence thinking among immunologists 
has not been examined, but such an analysis seems warranted. The putative direc-
tion (even restrictions) embedded in cognitive grammar (Langacker 2008) and 
linguistic relativism (known as the Whorf hypothesis) —weak and strong forms, 
notwithstanding— argues that language frames human reality, a thesis that has 
generated much comment and tentative affirmative conclusions (e.g., Lakoff 1987; 
Gumperz and Levinson 1996; Boroditsky 2009).
No matter where one falls on the wide spectrum of these constructivist and political in-
terpretations does not mitigate the general epistemological conclusion: Immunology, like 
all sciences, cannot be seg regated from the extra-curricular support derived from diverse 
influences (reviewed in Tauber 2009), or as Donna Haraway quips, “the messy political 
does not go away because we think we are cleanly in the zone of the technical” (Haraway 
1997, 68).
In this regard, critics from the social sciences have taken note of immunology’s concep-
tual underpinnings and have offered a diverse array of interpretations of immune theory. 
This trade in ideas reflects constructivist commitments, where science is seen as drawing 
from social, philosophical, and linguistic sources to model natural phenomena and, in turn, 
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scientific constructions offer metaphors and tropes for culture critics to assess society. In 
short, how the immune self is conceptually configured is not solely the provenance of labo-
ratory scientists. Indeed, the self crosses disciplinary borders with ease.
The most charged flash point concerns the biological agent viewed from the perspec-
tive of a host compromised – either subject to infection, aggressive malignancy, or trans-
plantation. Immunology’s central premise is that such an individual must have its com-
promised identity restored by effective immunity. The language of cognition widely used 
to describe immune functions (e.g., ‘recognition,’ ‘memory,’ ‘learning,’) supports this gen-
eral identification with the human subject (Tauber 1997; 2013a). Indeed, the ‘cognitive 
metaphor’ draws from a core knowing entity closely akin to a Cartesian understanding of 
a thinking thing (Tauber 1994).2 And the general acceptance that humans are ‘selves’ finds 
resonant support in the way immunity builds upon implicit Western understanding of in-
dividuality, a value highly prized (and protected) in First World democracies. However, the 
notion of an autonomous, individuality characterizing immune selfhood drew barbed com-
ment from those who regarded such a construction as imported from particular notions of 
social identity. Support for a more relational understanding of immunity echoes social the-
ory emphasizing the co-operative character of social intercourse.
Commentators have assigned cultural values to the insular immune conception by 
noting that the evident social differences between races, men and women, workers and 
managers, or citizens and foreigners have surreptitiously been imported into immune the-
ory. While some would regard such distinctions characteristic of modern notions of iden-
tity, culture critics have highlighted that there is nothing ‘natural’ about such differences. 
(H araway 1989a, Martin 1990; 1994; Rossiianov 2008). Instead they regard the self/non-
self basis of immune discrimination as a projection of social prejudice, namely, a way of 
making contested social boundaries a “natural” characteristic of social collectives. So just as 
Social Darwinians promoted “the survival of the fittest” as a trope to capture the social es-
sence of America a century ago, today “immune reaction” putatively functions in parallel 
fashion to that earlier projection (Napier 2003).3 The warfare metaphors — “attack,” “de-
fense,” “invaders” — so prevalent in immunology’s lexicon, dramatically illustrate this con-
struction, both in terms of the self/nonself dichotomy, as well as the privileged standing of 
2 “The cognitive metaphor is operative whenever psychological terms are used to describe actions or be-
haviors of nonpsychological agents [viz. nervous and immune systems/functions], or to explain actions 
or behaviors not caused by psychological states…. When microbiologists conceptualize organisms as 
recognizing the presence of a pathogen, or a virus as choosing hosts with diminished immune systems, 
they invoke the cognitive metaphor…and it is manifest in talk of cell migration, neural memories, mo-
lecular signaling, preferential developmental pathways, the goal of maximizing gene replication, and of 
biochemical systems as seeking equilibria. The cognitive metaphor is ubiquitous in the life sciences” 
(Wilson 2005, 75).
3 With the exploration of this idea comes David Napier’s social criticism — highlighted difference and 
protected personal boundaries rule at the expense of true tolerance, social integration, and free com-
munication. For Napier, the basic schema of an ‘I’ who must be defended against ‘them’ is more than 
just metaphorical: This scientific conceptualization has been internalized into our collective social 
psyche. Napier sees the dominant immunological precepts as little different from simple demonology 
made respectable by its appeal to science. The so-called “Age of Immunology” may thus be regarded as 
the power of a scientific paradigm about self and non-self that confirms and contributes to “our cul-
ture at war with itself” (Napier 2003, 7). 
Theoria 31(2).indd   211 27/4/16   17:56:00
212 Alfred I. Tauber
Theoria 31/2 (2016): 207-224
individuality over the commune. This interpretation and others akin to it thus regard im-
mune models based on host defense as instantiating an ideological orientation of social bar-
riers, as opposed to constructions based on co-operation and collective action (H araway 
1989a). Accordingly, immunology provides a political metaphor for American culture 
marked by atomistic individuality, and more provocatively, this cultural bias has putatively 
seeped into immune theory by valorizing an individuality celebrating personalized self-ful-
fillment at the expense of communal values.
However, as already described, an ecologically inspired research program challenges 
immunity conceived solely in a defensive format, and it has enjoyed a generous reception 
among some of immunology’s sociological critics. In support of this alternate relational for-
mulation of immune agency, they have argued that the foreign is not necessarily threaten-
ing or dangerous (Haraway 1989a; Weasel 2001).4 This is most clearly appreciated when 
the immune self is portrayed in its full ecological context. Accordingly, instead of a mod-
ernist notion of the self as a given entity neatly defined, i.e., entailed by its own “selfness” 
and guarded by an immune system, an ‘ecological’ understanding of organismic identity 
reconfigures the agent in dialectical encounter with the world, both within the body of the 
animal and beyond the host in a world fraught by ambiguous friend and foe relationships 
(Levins and Lewontin 1985). This view is not a vague metaphysical interpretation, but 
rather a conception based on immune activity determined by the mutually affecting pres-
ence of the other and a revised understanding of autoimmunity and the ecological place-
ment of the organism.
The immune self co-opted
Whether or not immunologists have explicitly appropriated cultural notions of personal 
identity for their models of immunity, the idea of ‘immunity’ has strong public appeal and 
has percolated into common notions of biological selfhood. The AIDS epidemic serves as a 
particular vivid example of that authority, where HIV is popularly conceived as literally de-
stroying ‘the self’ (Martin 1994). And social critics have taken immunity —centered on ex-
trapolated notions of ‘immunization’ and ‘autoimmunity’— to characterize capitalist socie-
ties. Some would even maintain “immunological ideas now provide the primary conceptual 
framework in which human relations take place in the contemporary world” (Napier 2003, 
3). In the more recent chapters of this interchange, socio-political critics, who argue that 
“the self” serves as a metaphor to model contemporary Western societies, have further ex-
tended a confrontational understanding of immune function by invoking “immunization” 
as an explanatory model for understanding their core dynamics. For example, Ro ber to Es-
posito (2011) (who cites Niklas Luhmann, Ulrich Beck, Zygmunt Bauman [ibid., 193], 
4 While feminist critics abhor the power relations of supremacy of ‘self’ over ‘other’ that projects certain 
masculine ideals of dominance, the focus of their critique centers on a deeper epistemological stratum, 
namely that the self/other distinction is based on a masculine cognitive form of objectivity derived 
from such domination (Keller 1982; Harding 1986; 1991). Note, this line of argument includes the 
suggestion that women themselves, because of their feminine socialization, possess an epistemological 
perspective, which differentiates them from their male colleagues (Keller 1983; 1985; 1992; Haraway 
1989b; Weasel 2001, 36-9).
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and Jacques Derrida [ibid., 53] in support of this interpretation) maintains that immuniza-
tion captures the danger of contamination by the (social) ‘other’ (immigrant, lower classes, 
etc.) and the corresponding need to protect the social integrity of the invaded group. So, in 
these writings, the self, appearing under the guise of immunization, returns to the socio-po-
litical lexicon to model social theory, namely by asserting that immunization characterizes 
large-scale human intercourse, for better and for worse.
Note, concomitant with the newly achieved social fluidity of a global economy and cy-
ber-world connections, these critics see a counter-balance required for attaining some de-
fensive equilibrium between self and other reminiscent of the older uses of the immune self 
in immunology (Swiatczak 2013). The metaphor’s wide application — from religion and 
metaphysics to housing and cities — invokes the dialectics of borders and exchange, indi-
viduality and communes. Thus immunization is regarded as both protective and, in some 
sense, “lethal,” inasmuch as the foreign must be introduced as part of the immunization 
itself. In other words, just as in the immune system, the balance of intrusion and defense 
characterizes the social “bubble” in which humans live (Sloterdijk 2011).
Autoimmunity has also been co-opted by social critics (reviewed by Anderson and 
Mackay 2014, 144-54). Most notably, Jacques Derrida regarded autoimmunity as the in-
stantiation of the self’s own deconstruction, by which he meant that an internal process 
compromised the integrity of the person, i.e., sovereign integrity, but in that destruction, 
opportunities for transformation arose (Derrida 1994, 2003). In other words, autoimmu-
nity, while destructive was also a liberating or positive force providing for self-renewal.5
If we broaden the scope in which the contested definition or meaning of selfhood in-
cludes critiques from anthropology, philosophy, psychology, and feminism (e.g., Taylor 
1989; Butler 1993; Morris 1994; Foucault 2005), an extraordinary expanse of ideas still 
require placement into the general question of how implicit notions of personal identity 
have found expression in immune theory and vice versa. So while it is too early to judge the 
extent immune concepts have influenced cultural conceptions of the individual in the so-
cial sciences and self-identification in Western cultures more broadly, clearly a larger role is 
emerging. And, conversely, beyond using immunity to characterize the social, and placing a 
social perspective upon immune theory, some social scientists are looking at immunology 
to guide them in their own re-appraisal of assumptions concerning how ‘selfhood’ func-
tions in anthropology (Napier 2012a, 2012b; Scheper-Hughes 2012; Stollar 2012), inas-
much as the immune construction seemingly so clearly illustrates the ambivalent and recip-
rocal status of the Same and the Other (Moulin 2001; Moulin and Cambrosio 2001).
A final note concerning the relevance of this discussion: Although social critics have 
argued that immune theory borrows from the cultural conceptions of identity, the scientist 
characteristically takes little notice of such claims. Such correspondences and their deeper 
philosophical significance are not of her concern in a first order way, namely, in determin-
ing what she investigates or how. At the level of the laboratory then, little compels the in-
vestigator to heed these commentators, who might easily be dismissed as simply projecting 
their own biases, while the immunologist is focused on discovering facts. That facts must 
be interpreted (an exercise in which the play of values and subtle extra-curricular elements 
5 In regards to the ‘betrayal of the body,’ see also Esposito (2011, 17, 18, 141, 159) and Mark Taylor 
(1993).
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are inescapable) generally is unappreciated (Tauber 2009). And precisely at this point, in-
terpretation, the critic places her interest. We need not adjudicate the exchange, however, 
it seems self-evident that the dialogue described here has most significance for those con-
cerned with understanding cultural currents and their philosophical underpinnings. And 
to the extent contemporary formulations of immunity contribute to that analysis, we must 
decide what constitutes judicious comment and what may be dismissed as only provocative 
speculation. In the following discussion, an array of conjectures is entertained.
The specter of postmodernism
When this critical sociological literature is placed in its larger intellectual framework, post-
modern themes clearly appear. If the organism is conceived as an autonomous individual, 
a modernist understanding emerges, attendant with ideas about autonomy and protec-
tive borders, an agent owning social autonomy and exercising self-knowledge. And when 
regarded with a different conception of selfhood, one formed in line with certain current 
philosophical critiques of mind and postmodern portrayals of selfhood, then very differ-
ent characteristics will be appreciated.6 On these “deconstructed” philosophical and socio-
logical accounts, the self has been decentered, disenfranchised, and left untethered from its 
modernist conceits (e.g., Deleuze and Guattari 1977; Cadava, Connor and Nancy 1991; 
Foucault 2005). Indeed, on this view, capturing ‘the self’ has become an abdicated philo-
sophical project (Tauber 2013b). 7
Given the pervasive influence of these re-conceptions of personal identity, immune 
selfhood has been re-considered along the same postmodern lines (Tauber 1995; Weasel 
2001; Code 2006), a view that has kindred support in ecology (e.g., Drengson and Inoue 
6 This general orientation also has growing influence in contemporary philosophies of mind, where the 
self as such does not exist, but rather a phenomenal self —a process, not an entity— appears in con-
scious experience. (e.g., Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991; Metzinger 2003]).
7 This critique has extended to epistemological accounts as well. For example, Lorraine Code asserts that 
the standardized epistemic subject, namely, that the self of the liberal tradition, “still exists is question-
begging in its assumption that he has in fact ever been more than a fictive creature” (Code 2006, 203). 
She provocatively claims that such a knower would have had to exist in only narrowly conceived theo-
retical places, “abstracted and isolated from the exigencies and vagaries of human lives” (ibid.). By plac-
ing the self in real-life terms as a knowing agent radically enveloped in the environment in which she 
lives, Code would take full account of circumstances and context, or in other words, the ecology of liv-
ing. So instead of the view from nowhere, this trenchant critique (she calls an “ecological epistemol-
ogy”) ironically observes that the autonomous knower has a truncated view of the world and the bias 
of an insularity that limits his epistemological project: “Rooted in his observation post, which is strictly 
separated from anything he claims to know, this epistemic subject is restricted in his knowings to what 
he can [only] see from there” (ibid., 209). But more, “disconnected from accidents of embodiment, his-
tory, and place” that would discredit his knowledge claims, such a posture also expunges imagination, 
along with negotiation and interpretation, from his cognitive endeavors. To admit such subjective ele-
ments would otherwise compromise his neutral objectivity (ibid. 208), but in assuming such a stance 
the resulting omission of imagination is to reduce scientific thinking to an unrealizable mechanics. On 
this view, the liberal-conceived self is re-configured within an ecological ethos that acknowledges the 
value-laden character of knowledge and the subjectivity upon which it is based. 
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1995) and cognitive science (e.g., Shapiro 2011). Basically, Cartesian conceptions of indi-
vidual autonomy are being challenged by descriptions based upon the emergent and tran-
sient character of personal identity. Barely submerged beneath this alternate vision reside 
vague notions of organismic ‘contingency’ and ‘self-actualization,’ terms that tap into a 
postmodern vocabulary but are not generally regarded as suitable scientific language (Tau-
ber 1995). Nevertheless, modeling complex systems characterized by dynamical processes 
ruled by probabilistic events requires new ways of describing biological phenomena (Tau-
ber 2015b).8 We need not delve into this complex area to appreciate that once Enlight-
enment epistemological models are discarded (and the deconstruction of the self/nonself 
distinction in immune theory becomes important support for that move), substituting 
postmodern notions of agency are seamlessly invoked. Indeed, the intellectual Western 
elite has largely embraced a postmodern dismissal of essentialisms that have converged on 
the self, whether in art, philosophy, social sciences, or psychology, where agency is being re-
configured in unsettled ways.
To illustrate the close parallels between postmodern notions of agency and the im-
munological counterpart, let us take an example from the visual arts. Arguably, postmod-
ernism began when abstract painting introduced ‘de-representation’ as a substitute for the 
natural mimicry that had dominated artistic orthodoxy for centuries. During the early 20th 
century, the artistic avant garde rejected any formal criteria for ‘realistic’ depictions of re-
ality. With the monumental Cubist works of 1907-1912, some have argued that Pablo Pi-
casso and Georges Braque produced the greatest shift in art since the Renaissance (Gold-
ing 1988, xiii; Dickerman 2013; for overview see Rubin 1989; Braun and Rabinow 2014).9 
That assessment is more than proclaiming a revolution in art, for the metaphysical founda-
tions of Cubism go “all-the-way-down.” Their visual invention depicts the world as fully 
integrated, obliterating heretofore generally accepted lines of demarcation. Human figures 
lose their individuality and merge into the background; their features, like the musical in-
struments or fruit of the still life pictures, have lost their representational status. The por-
traits deconstruct individual attributes and depict the subjects immersed in the world in 
idiosyncratic ways. The viewer then must deliberately reconstruct their identity. And, of 
course, that interpretation remains private and peculiar to the spectator, who is locked into 
her own understanding and intuitions.
The Cubists jolted the viewer with a radical vision. One must work hard at seeing, 
which in turn awakens a self-consciousness of how we perceive the world (Schjeldahl 
2014). In these works, the artist has declared a revisionary epistemology: The world is, in 
8 Such approaches clearly differ from a biology built from simple, self-contained entities and requires or-
ganizational principles perhaps best described by non-linear logic, complexity theory, and self-organi-
zational precepts of various kinds. Immunology may well apply for these new ways of understanding 
the dynamics and organization of its object of study. After all, these theoretical approaches also seduc-
tively beckon in the neurosciences, genetics, metabolism, and ecology, where an emphasis on holism, 
chance, emergence and, most important, process, are increasingly perceived as characterizing biological 
systems (Kupiec 2009). 
9 To what extent Braque contributed to the elaboration of Cubism is disputed, where some commen-
tators see little contribution (e.g., Staller 2001; Dickerman 2013) others see Braque as an authen-
tic co-inventor (e.g. Golding 1988) if not the originator (Butler 1994, 56-62); for diverse views see 
Z elevansky (1992).
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fact, of one piece, and to whatever extent one sees discrete objects or persons, a particular 
schema imposes those characteristics. And more, the products of those schema (reminis-
cent of Kantian phenomena) is not real in an ordinary sense, but rather possess particular 
characteristics derived from the viewer’s culture and experience, for whatever ends and to 
whatever utility (Nisbett 2003). According to this view, the abstraction distills accidental 
details to reveal truths that lay beneath the surface (Poggi 1992, 129). In other words, Cu-
bists refracted reality based not on ordinary vision (the purveyor of presumed falsehoods 
and distortions), but rather on a putative deeper conception of reality.10 Their pictorial 
manifesto asserted that abstractions reveal the epistemological bedrock of contrived human 
perceptions.
Three general conclusions emerge from Cubism: 1) different perspectives yield dif-
ferent realities (already propounded by Nietzsche a generation earlier); 2) the world has 
no ‘natural kinds,’ i.e., humans see discrete objects and their relationships in different 
ways and while there is a high degree of accordance, relativism has displaced the uniform-
ity of some singular reality (Nisbett 2003); and 3) the subject is also integrated into her 
world so that bordered definitions of identity are replaced with contextual schemes. This 
epistemology closely resonates with key features underlying the ecological turn in immu-
nology.
When immunity is understood as negotiating the organism’s intercourse with the 
world, the boundaries of demarcation must allow for free exchange, and the immune sys-
tem then becomes the mediator of that economy. On this view, the immune system joins 
the nervous system as an information processor, and the notion of immunity serving prima-
rily as a defensive apparatus is subordinated to the larger task of placing the organism in its 
environment. In other words, the cognitive functions are primary, and the defensive mech-
anisms are secondary to the perceptive event (Tauber 2013a). Moreover, the perception of 
friend and foe is not determined by pre-determined meanings, but rather by the context of 
the object’s presentation.11 And here a cascade of characteristics of immunity follow: 1) the 
10 Such a presentation strips vision of the accidental to substitute the true ‘essential’ (Hughes 2013, 74-
5). The Cubist seems to say, “I can take a wrench to reality” and present the angled planes of the object 
world, those facets and “edges on which Nature must turn; see me…open it up, seize it by a firm and 
encompassing grip” (Bell 2014, 23). ‘Analytical cubism’ has strong philosophical resonance with anti-
representational epistemologies, where the painter has rendered representations of things as no longer 
“mimetic labels for reality than are the words which donate them. Everything here is part of an artifi-
cial language… which aims at defamiliarizing, estranging relationship to reality… It reveals the (relativ-
ist) conventions by which it was made, which clearly vary from picture to picture… As we interrogate 
these pictures for mimetic clues… we find that they refuse to come together to make a single object or 
sitter… The parts literally do not have to work together, and so demand a different kind of critical jus-
tification” (Butler 1994, 67-8).
11 How immune perception is understood varies with the underlying conception of the subject: In the 
modernist formulation, objects are represented to the self, and in the enactivist orientation, represen-
tation is replaced with presentation (Shapiro 2011; Tauber 2013a). In this latter formulation, meaning 
no longer rests on representations carrying essential definition, but rather the world is presented and 
recognized directly (and thus circumventing the problem of how to traverse the subject-object divide). 
Accordingy, the context of the perceived object determines meaning, and when applied to the ecologi-
cal (or relational) orientation to model immunity, the object (distinguished as friend or foe) depends 
on the context of the encounter.
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discrimination of self and other have no formal or essential properties, and thus demarca-
tions of self and other are fluid; 2) as a result of intimate cooperation alignments, individ-
uality assumes an ambiguous standing, further obscuring the identity of an immune self; 
and 3) as observers we impose the subject-object divide that distorts the biological reality of 
process-driven phenomena; obviously scientific categorizations facilitate investigations, but 
current efforts have failed to capture the full dynamics of the system at work.12
In conclusion, the ‘problem’ of immune selfhood points to a striking correspondence 
between current efforts to revise the character of immune identity and the contextualiza-
tion of the self so dramatically visualized by Picasso and Braque a century before the cur-
rent shift in conceptions of the organism. I maintain that this shared conception of the self 
reflects a rejection of the modernist insular design of personal identity and replacement 
with a ‘postmodern’ deconstruction. Drawing such parallels is hardly extreme. After all, if a 
radical reorientation about the human agent took hold in the Western imagination, can we 
expect that repercussions of that shift would not be felt in a science so committed to ideas 
of agency embedded in its own theory? In other words, would not interpretations of im-
munology draw from a postmodern Zeitgeist if such models were readily available and then 
effectively captured immune phenomena? Given the rich metaphorical use of personhood 
throughout immunology’s history (Tauber 1994), a tentative affirmation seems reasonable. 
I conclude with more wide-ranging postulations.
Immunology in its Zeitgeist
Investigative inquiry and the interpretation of epistemic findings are subtly oriented 
along certain non-epistemic lines, what Helen Longino calls, “contextual empiricism” 
(Longino 1996). The effort to identify background assumptions investigators employ in 
the questions they ask, the hypotheses they present, and the data they select to support 
their interpretations enriches our understanding of both scientific creativity and bias (i.e., 
emotional prejudice or unrecognized values [Howes 2012]). The case of the immune self 
suggests how this negotiation has occurred in a vibrant and rapidly evolving science. Per-
haps because the changes have occurred so rapidly and because the human resonances be-
12 “Systems biology” has been vigorously promoted as the antidote to “molecular biology’s obsession with 
metaphysical reductionism” (Woese 2004, 179; Kitano 2001). The basic goal, stimulated by the in-
ability to process the myriad, complex data derived from modern molecular techniques coupled to the 
frustration to adequately model the organization and regulation of complex systems, is to reverse the 
prevalent reductive strategies that have failed to capture the dynamics of systems-as-systems. Simply, 
reductive strategies alone are inadequate to address the challenge of dynamic system modeling. Note, a 
systems approach may be applied to either the self/nonself or ecological conception of immunity. The 
distinguishing difference between these two orientations is, at minimum, how to conceive both the 
borders of the system (i.e., bounded limits of the regression analysis would be drawn differently) and 
the thresholds of immune activity counted as significant (i.e., the noise of the system assumes different 
weight in the two conceptions). So conceptually, the arguments for and against these competing views 
are not decided by the applicability of a system analysis, but rather on how the parameters of that anal-
ysis are chosen. Whether better results for modeling immune functions are obtained with an insular or 
ecological orientation will only be decided by future research.
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tween the laboratory and personal identity are so apparent, the case example of immunol-
ogy’s associations with its larger culture is of particular interest.
Strategies for reconciling internal and external accounts vary, for ideological influ-
ences invariably remain subtle; the commitments to obscure conceptual structures usually 
rest dormant; social, linguistic, and political effects often lay hidden, but in the end, each of 
these extracurricular influences plays some greater or lesser role, and the struggle for parsing 
the contribution of any ‘outside’ factor is an interpretive venture (Tauber 2009, 101ff.). In 
this regard, ‘the self’ serves as a scaffold upon which to hang experimental data and an im-
plicit presence to direct immunity’s modeling. How the self is devised carries certain con-
ceptual commitments ordering those interpretations. This process rests on the cognitive 
metaphor and linked notions about agency, whose long cultural pedigree and current so-
cial thinking carries meanings derived from a complex cultural construction. One might 
contest the extent of wider cultural correspondences, but the analogies are, at the very least, 
highly suggestive. This is not to contend that immune theory supports particular formula-
tions of personal identity, only that echoes reverberate between certain hypotheses regard-
ing immune models and the language — with its cultural meanings attached — used to de-
scribe those theories.
And if we cast the conceptual net towards a wider horizon, other more diffuse ‘exter-
nal’ influences may be surmised as playing a role in the reception of immunology’s eco-
logical perspective. I am referring to the collective experience that the earth is facing an 
environmental crisis, if not a catastrophe. As a result, the ether of environmentalism has 
enveloped all of us, and immunology is finding its own expression in response. The envi-
ronmental movement has heightened awareness of human dependence on intricate eco-
logical balance, so, as opposed to only a generation ago, the immune system is now being 
firmly placed in an environmental context in which immunology and ecology have formed 
a new disciplinary amalgam. That professional response has roots in the political and social 
attempts to better situate human life in our natural habitats.
Similarly, the mind-set of globalization that would make an ecological sensibility a 
powerful determinant on scientific thinking is even further submerged beneath the labo-
ratory. Nevertheless, how can we now think of agency absent consideration of the current 
vast economic globalization that accentuates open exchange and information transfer? 
This socio-economic transformation is a different way of presenting the human global so-
cio-eco-political ecology, one that is based on cultural determinants, not the environment 
per se. Nevertheless, the same basic turn from insularity brings a set of social values, both be-
nign and malignant: The call for tolerance and pluralism in identity politics, which, on the 
one hand supports ideals of inclusiveness, and on the other hand, highlights the traumas of 
social-religious xenophobia, which recalibrates personal identity on a very different basis. 
And adjoining that confrontation, universal moral claims and underlying conceptions of 
moral agency have been severely compromised, if not nullified. In short, the moral, social, 
and political definitions of agency are hotly contested.
The larger conceptual scaffolding upon which immune theory has been sketched repre-
sents another ‘ecology’ of immunology, namely, the ill-declared social context of the science 
writ-large. And here we join the seemingly endless debate about the construction of knowl-
edge (Tauber 2009). On this multifocal account, drawn with sources from both within and 
outside the laboratory, immunology exhibits the easy transfer of cultural ideology into the 
science and then back again. How the boundary between the two domains is drawn, has 
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been, and will continue to be, highly debated. Understanding why is part of the endeavor, 
indeed, such an analysis is a constitutive element of science conceived in its broadest social 
and intellectual context.
In this regard, immunology offers a particularly interesting framework for discussions 
of personhood. The evolution of the ‘self’ concept tracks a conceptual arc that begins in 
the 17th century with political philosophy centered on protecting citizen autonomy (de-
noting political and forensic rights), and culminates in postmodern critiques, where self 
has become a ‘four-letter’ word connoting the conceits of a male-configured construction 
of identity framed around power relations and dominance. That trajectory finds a corre-
sponding history in immune theory that stretches on a spectrum from an assaulted insular 
self to an ecological understanding of an organism establishing its identity in concert with 
an environment of others. With this latest turn, individuality has been subordinated to re-
lationships. This shift parallels the same transition undergone in the discourse on personal 
identity in the larger culture, and thus commentators have easily moved from one domain 
to the other. Indeed, here we have a vivid example of science and society in dialogue, where 
the boundaries separating these realms are open and easily traversed (Gieryn 1995).
The more general issue of science supporting agency with particular characteristics calls 
our attention, for the epistemological status of selfhood has central interest in how personal 
identity is configured far more broadly. If agency of a particular orientation can be shown 
to have scientific validity, then conceptions of collectives that develop from those initial 
characterizations assume credibility as expressions of some ‘natural’ order. For instance, if 
autonomy becomes a governing principle, the social standing of individuals within the col-
lective leads to values prioritizing individuality in social organizations. In other words, nat-
uralizing personal identity increasingly sways arguments about persons in virtually all of 
the contemporary debates about human nature, e.g., the evolutionary origins of altruism; 
the status of gender and sexuality as natural categories; the basis of violence; the morality 
of capitalism; the character of ethics. For those seeking consilience and a reduction of com-
plex behaviors to genes and molecular transmitters, the immune self offers a ready platform 
for their scientism to support certain ideological positions over others. Yet, contemporary 
immunology has demonstrated that such characterizations are contested and preliminary at 
best. And more to the point, recognizing metaphoric elements in the scientific construct of 
selfhood must be acknowledged, which is not to dismiss the utility of such usage, but rather 
to recognize its rich idiomatic function.
This is not a trivial matter. The implications of the greater contest between modernist 
and postmodernist conceptions of the subject reflect a moral deliberation beyond the epis-
temological debate. On the account offered here, just as the immune self rests between two 
competing formulations —autonomous versus relational— so too are Western societies 
similarly balancing different conceptions of the citizen, in terms of individual and commu-
nal identities. And in that consideration, to deconstruct the self, immune or otherwise, is a 
transformation that has been strongly resisted. Indeed, the lines separating postmodernists 
and modernists remain firmly in place. The freedom associated with liberal precepts of in-
dividuality is not readily mortgaged, much less, forsaken. Indeed, despite efforts of the most 
influential twentieth-century philosophers to revamp the modernist conception of mind 
and personal identity that accompanies those descriptions, the basic appeal of human au-
tonomy dominant during the modern period is not easily dislodged (Tauber 2013b). So the 
collective attraction of adhering to ‘the self’ in its individualistic incarnation stays in service 
Theoria 31(2).indd   219 27/4/16   17:56:01
220 Alfred I. Tauber
Theoria 31/2 (2016): 207-224
to a larger cultural agenda, namely, by fortifying a vision of personal identity conceived in 
terms of a judicial-political model of an agent’s independence. This specific understanding 
of principled personhood carries a rich history and a strong political philosophy to bolster 
its credentials. Consequently, personal autonomy enjoys an entrenched position in con-
temporary thought. Its rejection moves against a strong cultural tide.13
In conclusion, the controversy swirling around the immune self mirrors a much larger 
drama, for just as traditional notions of immune identity have resisted displacement, so too 
have modernist notions of individuality remained anchored in the Western psyche. At the 
very least, by peering at both the laboratory and its encompassing intellectual framework 
we achieve insight that is enriched by both perspectives. Such is the dialogue between sci-
ence and society, a conversation in which immunology has become a full partner.
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